Webdiary - Founded and Inspired by Margo Kingston

Geoff, you wrote: "Israel does not ethnically mark its citizens and differentiate rights accordingly. (Where do you get this stuff from?)"

There certainly is ethnic categorisation of Israeli citizens by the government, and a range of institutionalised discriminations on that basis (something Will, for example, has not disputed).

This has been covered already. I suggest that before leaping in on this aspect of the discussion, you go back through this thread and catch up on earlier postings concerning flaws in Israeli democracy, and the applicability of the term 'apartheid'. (These include various links to articles etc).

Will, I have already named states that I would consider liberal democracies - I believe I suggested (in passing) that East Timor was one example. Australia would be another.

The applicable criteria are pretty obvious in general terms - certainly universal suffrage is prominent among them (ie. all citizens have a right to vote regardless of their race, or gender or ownership of property), along with certain liberties (or rights and freedoms) shared by all individuals and sections of the population, whether majority or minority social groups. Critical among these would be freedom of expression, freedom of association, and equality before the law (as well as due process under the rule of law).

Its this final criteria that has been the one at issue when it comes to Israel's claims to democratic status.

The opposite of a liberal democracy could be an 'illiberal democracy': and the main criteria here would presumably involve some system of democratic voting - perhaps even universal suffrage - but with state incursions on the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals or minorities.

I'd suggest by this criteria Israel could be seen as an 'illiberal democracy'. And I maintain that the nature of the illiberal practices are a form of apartheid.

Grant, these aren’t my criteria for nationhood. Believe it or not, nations and nation states are a popular area for research.

So we go back 2000 years, and the Jews were a nation. That’s nice. What’s your point? You ask “At what point in time does a nation cease to be a nation?”

I thought that would be obvious - when they fail to meet the test for linguistic, geographical and cultural continuity. As for Reform Jews and Hassidic’s both being moved by the cry of the Shofar - does this mean that Christians all over the world that spend Good Friday shared the profoundness of the day somehow share enough cultural continuity for nationhood?

Geoff, thanks for your critique of what’s being taught in Uni’s today, and your condescension is appreciated. Obviously, I must be a uni student, or have studied this at university, and no doubt I’ve been brainwashed too... I’ll try and keep that in mind, see if I can’t throw off my ideological baggage. (cough)

Regarding Zionism’s “broad church” and “Herzl's early writings have been termed 'political' I suppose in that they were focussed on 'political rights'."

If I may point out - Hertzl was so secular that religious nationalist movements have had great difficulty fitting him to a different mould. Look at Archnuetenland - the model of the completely secular society. The “broad church” drew followers but that model that was “sold” to the rest of the world, and remains today the “ideologically acceptable” and officially promulgated version of Zionism remains the Zionism of “political rights”. That there was a tense standoff between Jabotinsky and Ben Gurion is a matter for the record - yes, the broad church was there - but the fact remains that that it was political Zionism that was the main - and won the day.

You don’t need to accept the criteria for nationhood. No problems. But tell me - what are your criteria? I mean, should East Timor have gone for independence? What about the Kurds? Should Tibet get independence from China? Why are the Jews a nation (as opposed to Israeli Jews, again, let me stress that)? Do you have criteria, or is it an emotional call?

With the language - sorry, I did mean vernacular - so say Yiddish or Arabic over ritual use of Hebrew.

Re: your analogy with the tailor is flawed - nations aren’t “made to measure”. It seems to me that the this is a little closer to your argument: A pair of pants have two separate compartments for legs. Here’s a skirt. But I define the “skirt” as “pants”. Obviously, “pants” have been defined incorrectly, and the description should be modified to include skirts as well.

Regarding the territorial continuity and your comments “How could you write that with a straight face? Wasn't that the entire purpose of the exercise?”

Which is why I accept Israeli Jews as a “nation”- they meet those criteria. If territorial continuity was so fundamental to this mythical Jewish nation, I mean - if it was the "whole point" - why do half of the world's Jews live outside of Israel, and support Israel from a distance?

Will wrote: “Moshe Sasson, an aide to then-prime minister Levi Eshkol notes, "On June 19, 1967 the Government announced that Israel would be ready to give back the sovereignty over Sinai to Egypt and over the Golan to Syria, in return for signed peace treaties." The West Bank and Gaza were not explicitly mentioned in this announcement, according to Sasson, so it's not clear if this was separate to the cabinet decision Shlaim is talking about. The June 19 cabinet decision was transmitted through the US Government to Egypt and Syria, and both rejected the offer.”

It is in fact the same decision. Shlaim’s point was that there is no evidence in the records (apart from Eban’s claim) that this offer was transmitted to Egypt and Syria. And the Israeli cabinet at any case backed – indoors - away from it well before Khartoum. But that is not even the main point here. You claimed, in your first post on this matter, that the offer included ‘most of the West Bank’. It clearly didn’t. If the offer on Sinai and the Golan Heights did reach Egypt and Syria it is quite understandable that they didn’t fall for it. It could only be interpreted as an obvious attempt to split the Arab League and to neutralise the two states that later turned out to be the most formidable opponents in the Yom Kippur War.

Will: “The terms of the Israeli cabinet decision of June 19 1967 had in fact already been communicated to Palestinian leaders expressing Israel's willingness to give back all of the Golan Heights and Sinai, in return for peace treaties and to offer the Palestinians autonomy in the West Bank leading possibly to independence and statehood. The Palestinians declined to talk about the offer for fear they'd be killed.” (According to Michael Oren.)

You don't specify any dates here. Shlaim wrote regarding the decisions on the West Bank: “On 20th August the cabinet adopted the military component of Dayan’s plan by deciding to establish five army bases on the mountain ridge ... The debate on the settlements continued, and here the Allon Plan became the main basis for government policy.” Some autonomy! This was, I repeat, more than a week before Khartoum.

Will: "According to Yitzhak Rabin, on June 19, 1967, 'the government resolved to return territories in exchange for peace. After the Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its position'. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma'ariv 1979) pp. 226-227.”

The implicit suggestion here that the Israeli government only changed the decision it took on the 19th of June AFTER Khartoum fits in the propaganda pattern you are so keen to uphold.

Shlaim wrote: “As early as mid-July the politicians started approving plans for the building of Jewish settlements on the Golan Heights. In doing so, they reversed their own policy and embarked on the road toward creeping annexation.” So this was six weeks BEFORE Khartoum. I generally have little difficulty with the choice between the word of a historian and that of a politician.

Will: "This theme was not new though. The BBC had already reported on 13 June, 'Israel has already declared its intention to remain in control of its newly occupied territories until permanent peace with its Arab neighbours can be established'."

How does this help your case?

Will: “On June 15, 1967 the Israeli cabinet had unanimously adopted the following resolution (mostly talking about Syria), and I quote: "Israel stands for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Syria (and Egypt) on the basis of the international boundary ... the conditions for a peace treaty are: (1) a total demilitarization of the Syrian [Golan] Heights ... (2) an absolute guarantee for free water flow from the River Jordan sources into Israel either by an alteration in the northern boundary or by an agreement between the two countries." [M. Avidan, “19 June 1967: The Israeli Government Hereby Decides,” Davar (in Hebrew, Tel Aviv) 2, 5, 19 June 1967] “

Repetitive. The decision on 19th June duplicated that and talked about the international borders with Egypt as well. This statement does not provide evidence for your claim that an offer was indeed made to the Arab states before Khartoum – let alone that it offers any more evidence for your original contention that that offer included ‘most of the West Bank’.

The Arab war rhetoric you quote so copiously after this point in your letter consists of unsourced quotes and is, moreover, irrelevant to your case. With this or similar war rhetoric the Arabs might have served their case domestically but it says very little about their real intentions. We probably agree that it was counterproductive internationally (you, for instance, still use it against them two generations later).

The Israelis went about things far more cleverly. They first announced, on the first day of the conflict (through PM Eshkol), that they didn’t want to retain any land that was going to be temporarily occupied in the course of the war, then decided to keep it anyway and, moreover, managed to blame Arab ‘intransigence’ for that.

Will: “I say the Arabs were well aware of the June 19, 1967 Israeli cabinet decision, and of the overall Israeli position of willingness to trade land for peace, at the time they issued their three noes.”

This is a mere assertion.

The whole case you have been trying to make fits into a Israeli public relations pattern that was established right after 1948 and has long since been shown up for what it is by the ‘new historians’. Israel was always after peace but ‘Arab intransigence’ blocked all their efforts in that direction. There was no one to talk to on the other side etc.

When I find the time (which will not be for the next few days) I might write a bit more regarding this theme. Answer to your newest posting will have to wait till then as well.

David, I have read the whole thread about apartheid etc. It's just that I didn't buy that's all. Nor would anybody else who made the effort to acquaint themselves with the truth, in my view.

Want my take on the great liberal/illiberal democracy controversy? Israel is an imperfect liberal democracy which still has a long way to go, but the best way to go the Israelis are in the best position to judge. Just like Australia really. And NZ. And the US, UK, Canada, South Africa, Norway, France, Switzerland.

Michael, It seems like I've heard this same old song before.

I'm familiar with the CNI site and the organisation and I do not regard it as a legitimate resource. Nor will I engage directly with anything the CNI publishes.

Israel does have a constitution as it happens but not of the US type. It is set out in its Basic Laws and in the Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel which is adopted in the Basic Laws. There is currently a project underway to completely re-write the constitution within the parameters of the foundation document. If you are genuinely interested in the current legal status and rights of Israeli Arabs and other minorities, and the present position of what is being proposed and why then go here.

Also take a look at the Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel which has been adopted in to the Basic Laws and will form the heart of the new constitution. Note in particular Paragraph 13.

Michael, if you have a problem with the Law of Return then you have a problem with the whole concept of Jewish nationhood. If you have that problem but do not have a problem with the concept of Palestinian nationhood then there really isn't anything left for us to discuss.

Arie Brand, you asserted that Rabin was not even in on the 19 June Israeli cabinet decision. I produced a quote from him:

"According to Yitzhak Rabin, on June 19, 1967, 'the government resolved to return territories in exchange for peace. After the Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its position'. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma'ariv 1979) pp. 226-227.”

There's a quote and a source. This is not an "implicit suggestion" - it's an explicit statement. Do you refute this or not? Yes or no. No shilly-shallying.

You have not refuted any of the quotes from Arab leaders in the lead-up to the 1967 War, just tried the evasion that they were "unsourced." The Nasser quote was not unsourced - I gave a date and a source. They are not irrelevant at all - the Arab intention, before, during, and after, the June 1967 was to destroy Israel. Spoken in their leaders' own words. But maybe you know better. So tell us Arie, what WERE the Arabs' intentions?

I said "the Arabs were well aware of the June 19, 1967 Israeli cabinet decision, and of the overall Israeli position of willingness to trade land for peace, at the time they issued their three noes." Are you saying they didn't listen to the BBC news?

I said "The terms of the Israeli cabinet decision of June 19 1967 had in fact already been communicated to Palestinian leaders expressing Israel's willingness to give back all of the Golan Heights and Sinai, in return for peace treaties and to offer the Palestinians autonomy in the West Bank leading possibly to independence and statehood. The Palestinians declined to talk about the offer for fear they'd be killed.” Dates - between June 10 and June 19, 1967.

Caroline, just so we're clear about this. Does it follow from what you are saying that you will accept that a Jew becomes apart of the Jewish nation once she reaches Israel and becomes an Israeli but not before? If so neat. I can live with that. End of argument.

Some more quotes from Arab leaders in the lead-up to the 1967 War:

May 20 from Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad:

"Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united... I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation."

May 16, 1967, Radio Cairo stated: "The existence of Israel has continued too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression. We welcome the battle we have long awaited. The peak hour has come. The battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel."

Oren cites recently declassified documents that reveal the Egyptians in fact planned to attack Israel on May 28, 1967. The plan, codenamed operation Dawn, was discovered by Israel. The Israelis told the Americans, the Americans told the Soviets, and Premier Kosygin wrote to Nasser. Nasser, having lost the element of surprise, called off the attack. The very next day, Nasser told the Egyptian National Assembly: "God will surely help and urge us to restore the situation to what it was in 1948."

At the UN in late May 1967, PLO Chairman Ahmed Shukhairy announced that "if it will be our privilege to strike the first blow" the PLO would expel from Palestine all Zionists who had arrived after 1917 and eliminate the state of Israel.

Can anyone refute these quotes? I'd prefer they were false.

Unfortunately there's still lots of this kind of rhetoric around even today. And that's what the real tragedy is for the Palestinians.

Geoff, Geoff ‘none so blind…’. Clearly your mind is made up. There is nothing to “buy” re: the existence of ethnic coding on Israeli citizen’s ID cards, it’s a fact (ask any Israeli). As is discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel.

It's equally clear that you are just going to dismiss any source that doesn’t reinforce your pre-existing views.

For example, no doubt you see an international independent organisation like Human Rights Watch as terribly jaundiced and anti-Israel so there’s no point directing you to their report entitled Second Class. Discrimination Against Palestinian Arab Children in Israel's Schools as just one example of what I mean when I talk about institutionalised discrimination Arab citizens face in Israel. (Even though the same organization also provides cogent criticisms of Arab state regimes. But never mind).

One last attempt (from me) nonetheless. Since you seem fond of government sites (as a source for critiques of government practices? Yeah, very sound thinking there) have a read of the US State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 pertaining to Israel. (That’s the government of the U S of A – hardly a source of hostile, slanted anti-Israeli material).

Note gentle references to heavier prison terms to Arab citizens than to Jewish citizens; the JNF statutes that prohibit the sale or lease of land to non-Jews (quasi-governmental body); claims that the Government was more restrictive in issuing building permits in Arab communities than in Jewish communities; the 1996 "Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel," which listed as priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking the territorial contiguity of Arab towns etc.

The report also makes mention of the fact that Israeli Arabs are not required to perform mandatory military service. Note that those who do not serve in the army have less access than other citizens to social and economic benefits for which military service is a prerequisite or an advantage, such as housing, new-household subsidies, and employment, especially government or security-related industrial employment. Indeed, Arab citizens (as the report notes) are not welcome in security related industries full-stop, ex-army recruits or not.

Tip of the iceberg. And I acknowledge some of these aspects of life as an Arab citizen of Israel are being challenged in Israeli courts (indeed, might this even be a prerequisite for their inclusion in the US report? Surely not - its the evenhanded and openminded US government after all, not one of those pinko terrorist-apologist human rights NGOs). I look forward to equitable outcomes.

But tell me this (from the earlier posts you claim to have read); the Arab language is recognized as one of Israel’s state languages. Why are public hearings, court cases, parliamentary procedures etc – in other words, the very stuff of civic participation – not conducted in Arabic as well as Hebrew? Or translated? Or available in translated form? And why does secondary school attainment in Hebrew weight more heavily in university entry than attainment in Arabic?

Oh, thats right. You will simply say its not true, no matter what sources I supply.

In the immortal words of the Wiggles – ‘Wake up Jeff’ (Geoff)!

Geoff, close, but no cigar... I accept that they become members of an Israeli nation. Not part of a Jewish nation.

Caroline, even if we take your criteria "linguistic, geographical and cultural continuity" (thanks for the condescention by the way).

Linguistic: Most Jews have at least some smattering of Hebrew. It is hardly surprising that those brought up in a non-Hebrew speaking country would not have that language as their first. I know a guy whose father is from Poland. The guy was born in Australia and speaks not a word of Polish but by virtue of his father's citizenship can claim Polish citizenship himself. Under your criteria he can't be a Pole yet the Polish government disagrees with you.

Geographical: Take my example above. Is this guy's father not a Pole because he no longer lives in Poland?

Cultural: You are correct, there are two distinct Jewish cultural streams - Ashkinazi and Sephardi but even these have many common links. A Californian is unlikely to like Bluegrass and eat Gumbo but does that mean he and a the guy from the deep south of the US are not both American?

Believe it or not, the Jews are a nation. The question is whether you accept it or not.

Grant: “Believe it or not, the Jews are a nation. The question is whether you accept it or not.”

I've told you what conditions I see as necessary for nationhood. You don't accept them. No problems. But tell me - what are yours? Just saying the Jews are a nation, doesn't make it so. Tell me what makes this the case.

Language=vernacular. Not a smattering of ritual Hebrew.

Your argument about your Polish friend’s citizenship doesn't really apply. It's prefaced on an integration of the state of Poland with the nation of Poles. The nation state - that which hands out citizenship - doesn't necessarily have anything at all to do with cultural affiliation. Obviously in the case of Poland there's a high level of cross over, but that's not to say it's one and the same.

You can be a member of a nation outside those criteria, but you can't have a nation without those criteria.

But as I said, you don’t agree with what I’ve put forward. So tell me what does make a nation.

Re the condescension. Apologies. Not my italics. And I thought I'd laid out pretty clearly the answer to the question. No rudeness intended.

Caroline, let me have another shot for the cigar. It had better be Cuban.

Let's accept the scholars' three criteria for nationhood (which I don't for reasons I'll explain if I have to).

Certainly the Ashkenazi Jews must meet the three tests. Shared cultural practices. Any argument? Territorial continuity. They lived in communities across Europe and Russia for centuries longer than most nations have existed. And in Yiddish there is a common vernacular albeit with dialects that is as about as vibrant and evocative as a language can get.

The scholars must agree that according to their template the Ashkenazim are a nation if there ever was one.

And the Sephardim? A bit hard to argue about territorial continuity given that they lived in communities dating back centuries and many dating back to Roman times. I assume no argument about shared cultural practices. And in Arabic and especially Ladino a definite common vernacular.

So the scholars must declare another nation. Not one Jewish nation but two.

And what do these two nations have in common? They are Jewish of course. So Israel was right to declare itself a Jewish national homeland all along even if the scholars insist that there are two Jewish nations in the homeland.

So there you are. No "emotion" at all. Not that I can see what's wrong with emotion as a criterion in defining nationhood in any event. In fact I'm astounded the scholars left it out. I would have thought it was critically important and would have put it at the top of my list of criteria.

Right that takes care of that one. Now about Tibet...

David, actually I've read both reports you've referred me to before and don't have any particular problem with the bodies that produced them. What they say deserves to be heard although whether they have said much that was not already known at the time and the subject of public political controversy in Israel is another matter. Sometimes I wonder how much of these various reports could be written without even visiting the country simply by subscibing to Israeli newspapers, political commentaries, official government reports, court reports and so on.

It's the CNI I object to. And many similar bodies. Usually they give themselves away. Sooner or later they either hyperlink to sites they claim as support authority which directly conflict with what they are saying or are fronts for ratbag conspiracy theorist groups or worse. There's a lot of it about. I read somewhere around here that something like over twenty crank conspiracy theory etc posts have been attracted to this thread and the other thread dealing with similar issues and have been DNP'ed. Count them. Twenty! At least I only get the cuts for abuse or unseemly language.

David, I believe it was me who mentioned that there was evidence that the military service exemption for most (not all) Israeli Arabs had unintended consequences in regard to access to employment. There are many other problems. I attempted to engineer the hyper-linking of the following site earlier but I'm not sure if it worked. Not on my computer. I keep getting the Jewish Virtual Library. (You see conspiracy theorists out there! They're infiltrating everything!)

I'm not going to buy into the language issue. Frankly I don't know a lot about it. I read an Israeli case report somewhere which ruled that road signs etc in areas with substantial numbers of Arabic speaking residents had to be in both Hebrew and Arabic and I know many Arab Israelis are fluent in Hebrew. And many Jewish Israelis are fluent in Arabic. In fact for many Arabic was their native tongue. But perhaps there is a problem here. If there is I'm sure the Israeli Arabs have not been shy to let the authorities know about it. In the bigger scheme of things and given the state of the world I find it hard to get worked up about. I'm more concerned about how languages are being taught in the local schools here than what's going on at the other side of the world. Especially English.

However if you're really concerned about it why not get a submission together and send it to the Constitution for Israel Project? Or for that matter on anything else about the civil and legal rights of Israeli Arabs that concerns you. It is a major focus of the Project as you can see in their site. You're far more likely to achieve something beneficial than by talking to us. Consider copying us in on anything you send.

Caroline Crompton says, "Why are the Jews a nation (as opposed to Israeli Jews, again, let me stress that)? Do you have criteria, or is it an emotional call?"

It's a good question, and no one has a single answer everyone agrees upon, even (especially!) among Jews. I find Mr Pearl's definitions resonate with me:

"A collective is entitled to nationhood when its members identify with a common history and wish to share a common destiny. Palestinians have earned nationhood status by virtue of thinking like a nation, not by residing where their ancestors did (many of them are only three or four generations in Palestine). Jews, likewise, are bonded by nationhood (i.e., common history and destiny) more than they are bonded by religion."

He goes on to say:

"Jewishness is more than just a religion. It is an intricate and intertwined mixture of ancestry, religion, history, country, culture, tradition, attitude, nationhood and ethnicity, and we need not apologize for not fitting neatly into the standard molds of textbook taxonomies — we did not choose our turbulent history."

You make a good point that we do have to distinguish between a "nation" and a "state." Many groups - Basques, Chechens, Canadian inuits, identify as "nations" though they do not have independent states. In those three examples each group has a degree of political and cultural autonomy within its own territory. The Australian example might be Abroriginal land councils.

Are Australian Aborigines a "nation?" Linguistically they are quite diverse, speaking (at the time of European arrival, as I understand it) possibly hundreds of different languages, so they would "fail" this test. Polynesians, by contrast, though geographically diffuse, still have strong linguistic links.

Caroline further notes " I accept Israeli Jews as a 'nation'- they meet those criteria. If territorial continuity was so fundamental to this mythical Jewish nation, I mean - if it was the 'whole point' - why do half of the world's Jews live outside of Israel, and support Israel from a distance?"

Also a good question, though I think you gave us a unintentional peak behind the curtain of your preconceptions with your use of the word "mythical."

It's an interesting point, but of course it's not the "whole point." But let's explore that idea. By this criterion, would all Jews would have to move to Israel to qualify as a "nation?" (There are some Israelis who believe that too, by the way.)

If we extend the concept, how would we approach other diaspora communities with strong emotional, familial, linguistic, cultural, religious, and economic connections to their ethnic "homelands" (for want of a better word)? Armenians, Irish, Indians, Greeks - all these communities have large diasporas. There are many examples. In many cases, as a practical matter, they could not all move to their lands of origin (eg. Armenia). Territorial affinity is only part of the story.

Sorry both Caroline and Geoff, but I think the debate about ‘what constitutes legitimate nationhood’ is a fairly sterile one.

My reading of the scholarship concerning nations and nationalism points to very little agreement on typological criteria for pre-existing nationhood. Ideas like ‘shared culture’ and ‘contiguous territory’ etc are a blurred mish-mash of temporally frozen (ie. static) observations of what are dynamic historical processes, popular and/or ideological notions of race or ethnicity, and Realpolitik descriptions of fait accompli.

Nations, like cultural identities, are relational projects. They are ongoing, unfolding political, strategic and social constructs. And in most cases (particularly post-colonial states) there is a fair degree of arbitrariness to them.

There are no ‘natural’ nations, whatever the criteria you care to use. For example, what linguists call ‘dialect chains’ that crisscrossed early modern Europe meant that, following the initial emergence of European states, people living on either side of a border often had more in common in cultural or ethnic or linguistic terms, than they shared with the capital or centre. National identity, or nationhood, had to be firmed up, policed even. And the imposition of a standard national language was part of this process, a process that very much ‘naturalises’ itself in retrospect (which itself is strategic).

East Timor is a good recent example. It was a project which, like so many post-colonial nation states, was driven by a colonially educated urban elite that embraced nationalism as an aspect of modernity and as a liberatory political project. In historical terms there is no difference culturally between the Timorese on each side of the islands’ border. Ironically, it took decades of Indonesian repression in the territory to establish the popular significance of the East Timor/West Timor border. The much vaunted ‘Catholic’ nature of East Timor emerged after the Indonesian invasion, not before it; Catholicism, like Portuguese, was originally limited to a tiny minority of educated mixed-descent Timorese based largely in Dili.

So nation-states are more often than not the political creation of social elites, just as ethnic identity often has a strong instrumental dimension, though popular discourse often views it as ‘primordial’. Indeed, the political expression of identity, in nationalist movements, inevitably creates or draws on (and often exaggerates) folk notions of primordiality to achieve instrumental aims (like the creation of a state). One of the scary things about all this is that one of the most historically effective means to do this is to create an Other against which one’s own primordial identity can stand in stark relief. Jews often functioned as the stock Other in European nation-building, for example.

To finish by addressing Will’s query: “are Jewish national aspirations legitimate?” I’d say no more or less than any other group that asserts a collective identity couched in terms of specific territorial claims. I think it would be unworkable, and nonsense, to try and create some criteria by which to measure which nationalistic expressions of collective identities are legitimate and entitled (deserving) from those that are not. Again, much of the time we're dealing with fait accompli anyway. For me, the issue of relative primordiality or artificiality of Jewish nationalism (Zionism) is a red herring. Those folks that asserted a political-territorial presence in what was then British Palestine were doing so in a territory that was not empty: there was no terra nullius in the lands of what has become contemporary Israel (as there was not in Australia). The lands were occupied, and had been for several thousand years. So the question is what has become of that extant population, how are they treated, and what role do they have in the formation of the state that came to encompass them. It’s the same measure that one can apply to any nation-state. And the best measure of answering this question, for me, involve the aspirations about human conduct and human value contained in evolving contemporary ideas about democracy, human rights, and international law. This is not my imposition – Israel uses the discourse of democracy itself. And against this standard, the treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories, and of Arabs in the Israeli state, is deserving of international condemnation.

Hi Caroline, apology accepted. I believe that it is a common national identity that makes a nation. I won't, however, debate further what makes Jews a nation (sorry, Bob Wall if my refusal to debate a point offends you) as to me you question is asking me to justify who I am. I don't believe that I (or any other person for that matter) should be asked to justify who they are.

May I ask, based on your definitions, is Jordan, for example, a "nation" or simply a "state"?

Geoff Pahoff writes: "if you have a problem with the Law of Return then you have a problem with the whole concept of Jewish nationhood. If you have that problem but do not have a problem with the concept of Palestinian nationhood then there really isn't anything left for us to discuss".

I do not have a problem with Israel existing safely within the so-called Green Line. I don't have a particular problem with the concept of 'Jewish nationhood'. However, the practical implementation of the Jewish nation as embodied by the state of Israel discriminates against its Arab citizens.

But this isn't about what I have a problem with or not. This is about the choice that Israeli society has made and the consequences of that choice. Simply, Israel cannot be both non-discriminatory and a Jewish nation. Public policy must be framed by the need to maintain a Jewish majority. Indeed, Binyamin Netanyahu has described Israeli Arabs as a "demographic problem".

Geoff, I do hope that the US State Department is legitimate enough for you. See this:
[extract]

The Bedouin sector was the weakest of all the population groups in the country. Bedouin living in unrecognized villages had no way to obtain building permits. The COI report stated that the living conditions and the hardships of the Bedouin community should be afforded "special attention." According to a well-known Bedouin advocacy organization, during the year, the Government destroyed over 35 Bedouin houses, a Mosque, 13 shops and a water container. For example, in May, security forces demolished two houses in the unrecognized Bedouin villages of Kherbat Al Ras and Al Fara'h in the Negev. According to this same organization, hundreds of security forces and aircraft arrived in Kherbat Al Ras and Al Fara'h, closed all the main entryways and demolished the two houses, leaving the inhabitants homeless. In 2002, the Government destroyed 52 Bedouin homes in the unrecognized village of al-'Araqib. The Government continued to prohibit building in that village.

Israeli-Arab organizations have challenged publicly the 1996 "Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel," which listed as priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking the territorial contiguity of Arab villages and towns, on the grounds that it discriminated against Arab citizens; the Government continued to use this document for planning in the Galilee. A hearing on objections to this plan was held in March but at year's end, there had not been a response from the National Council for Building and Planning, and the plan had not been implemented.

[snip]

There were approximately 130,000 Bedouin in the Negev; of this number, approximately half lived in 7 state-planned communities and the other half lived in 45 settlements that were not recognized by the Government. The recognized Bedouin villages receive basic services from the Government; however, they remain among the poorest communities in the country. The Government reported that Bedouins who move to these state-planned communities were compensated for abandoned property, provided grants, as well as new land free of charge.

The unrecognized villages were declared illegal by the National Planning and Building Law of 1965, which rezoned the lands on which they sat as nonresidential, and the Government claimed ownership of the land. New building in the unrecognized villages was considered illegal and subject to demolition. According to the Government, recognizing these villages would conflict with its attempts to establish new villages in "an orderly manner and would leave disputes over the land unresolved." Residents of the unrecognized villages paid taxes to the Government; however, their villages were not eligible for government services. Consequently, such villages were denied basic health, education, water, electricity, employment opportunities, and other services. Only 13 of the unrecognized villages had elementary schools. There are no high schools in any of the unrecognized villages. Private efforts have supplied some unrecognized villages with water, and the courts have ordered the provision of limited health and education services.

The Olive Branch and Khartoum I

Will wrote: “On June 19 1967, the Israeli unity government issued a statement declaring it would 'return the Golan Heights to Syria, Sinai to Egypt and most of the West Bank to Jordan, in return for peace treaties with its Arab neighbours, normalization of relations and guarantee of navigation through the Straits of Tiran'. ...Heads of eight Arab states held a summit at Khartoum Sudan on 29 August-1 September 1967, and issued the Khartoum Declaration.”

The Khartoum Declaration, one will recall, contained the famous ‘three no’s”: no peace, no negotiations and no recognition.

Thus we have here a picture of Israel holding out publicly the olive branch to obstinate Arab nations and being rudely rebuffed by them.

I have argued before, and will argue again, that this juxtaposition provides a caricature of the situation – a caricature that hasn’t survived the opening up of the relevant archives, except for those who have a vested interest in the myth around it.

The Israeli cabinet did not ‘issue a statement’ on the 19th of June. The decision of that day was taken in the deepest secrecy (even Rabin, not a member of cabinet at the time, did not know about it), did not concern the West Bank, did not result in an ‘offer’ to the Arab states and was soon a historical artefact anyway because the Israeli cabinet changed its mind several times and had made its own decision undone well before Khartoum. Barely a month after that decision was made politicians approved plans for building settlements on the Golan Heights. Before that Jerusalem had been ‘unified’ in the teeth of strong opposition from the Americans (the Israelis argued, with a fine feeling for semantic subtleties, that ‘unification’ was not the same as ‘annexation’). Mid August far reaching plans for the settlement of the West Bank had been adopted.

Thus Shlaim argues that the decision of the 19th of June had become a ‘dead letter’ well before Khartoum. Those who maintain that the Israeli cabinet only reversed its policy after Khartoum have but a scintilla of formal truth on their side in the fact that the precarious decision (taken with a majority of one vote) of 19th June was finally formally buried in October.

Over the last few days I went through the documents in the online archive of the U.S. Department of State, now open to public inspection on the basis of the 30-year rule. I specifically looked at the material from the period between the date of that ‘announcement’ that never was and the beginning of the Khartoum Conference (thus from around the twentieth June 1967 until the end of August of that year). I intended to put the most relevant documents in webdiary but they came to seventy pages. I have thus removed the lengthy archivalia on the consultations with the Russians and have only retained the in my view most telling fragments of the rest. The documents follow here below (there is as far as I know no copyright on it and there are only fragments here anyway).

They completely confirm the picture Shlaim gave of the situation which is not astonishing because he went through the same documents (plus other archives of course – specifically the Israeli archives that are, as far as I know, not online).

Shlaim is completely right in asserting that there never was an offer to Syria and Egypt for Israel to withdraw to the international boundary. The relevant document is the first one in the series that follows. As one can see Eban was, in relation to the June 19 decision by the Israeli Cabinet, not talking to the Americans about an 'offer' at all – he spoke of ‘tentative conclusions’ and the then U.S.Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, referred to Eban’s statements as ‘preliminary thoughts’. It is also completely clear that the Americans were not asked to convey these ‘preliminary thoughts’ to Syria and Egypt. If that had been the case there would have been a memorandum of some sort about it, plus information on the reaction of these two Arab countries. There is nothing at all.

This explains also the following statement by Rusk in his memoirs entitled “As I Saw It”(I have quoted this before on the Pape-thread but obviously it didn’t fit into Wil’s picture of the situation).

Rusk wrote:

"For twenty years, since the creation of Israel, the United States had tried to persuade the Arabs that they needn’t fear Israeli territorial expansion. Throughout the sixties the Arabs talked continuously about their fear of Israeli expansion. With the full knowledge of successive governments in Israel, we did our utmost to persuade the Arabs that their anxieties were illusory.
"And then following the Six Day War, Israel decided to keep the Golan heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai, despite the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on the first day of the war went on Israeli radio and said that Israel had no territorial ambitions. Later in the summer I reminded Abba Eban of this, and he simply shrugged his shoulders and said, 'We’ve changed our minds'. With that remark, a contentious and even bitter point with the Americans, he turned the United States into a twenty-year liar."

I think Eban would have reacted differently if he could have reminded Rusk of a peace offer along the lines of the June 19 decision.

One explanation I have for Eban’s pertinent assertion that such an offer was made is the one he himself offered to Lord Caradon, when this diplomat told him what the international understanding was about Resolution 242. Eban surmised that Caradon’s recollection ‘had dimmed with the passage of time’.

It should also be kept in mind that the Israeli cabinet veered at that time in quite a few different directions (though they all seemed to lead to a hardening of its stance) and Eban’s recollection might not only have dimmed but also have gotten a bit mixed up. The possibility that he himself got caught up in the myth about ‘the olive branch and Khartoum” can also not be excluded.

Whatever the case may be, there was no ‘offer’(I will not comment on Will’s laughable suggestion that, pre 19th June, diplomacy was conducted via the BBC).

Israeli changeability in that period was partly due to the influence of General Dayan who, according to Oren had, together with Rabin (who, however, was not a member of cabinet), been turned into a public icon by the war.

Oren wrote:

“ “ I’m waiting for the phone to ring”, Dayan was widely quoted as saying, implying that Israel would be willing to return territories if the Arabs came forward for talks. But in the Cabinet debate on the June 19 resolution, Dayan argued that there was no use discussing the terms for peace since the Arabs would never accept Israel. He protested the decision, saying, “We cannot withdraw from Sinai and the Golan on the basis of a single vote … “ Six weeks after the end of the Six-Day war, according to the British Embassy’s count, Dayan voiced no less than six different opinions on peace.” (2002, p.315/316).”

And Shlaim wrote in his review of Oren’s book:
“Defence minister Moshe Dayan was a law unto himself. … The resounding military victory over which Dayan presided greatly enhanced his political power at home, and he used this power to impose his muddled and myopic ideas on the wavering cabinet. In the country of the blind, the on-eyed man was king.”

To be continued

The Olive Branch and Khartoum II

I spoke earlier of the gradual hardening of the Israeli stance pre-Khartoum. Though the Americans didn’t know the specifics of the Israeli cabinet decisions taken at that time they were very well aware of the general drift of these.

So spoke Saunders in his conversation of August 15 with the Israeli ambassador to the USA (see document 418) about his concern ‘that Israel seemed to be digging into its present position more solidly every day ... I saw a problem for both of us in the rapidly sharpening image of Israel as the intransigent victor holding onto its spoils”. And from the last document presented here (no. 431) which contains a conversation, held between the Israeli minister and Walt Rostow a few days (29th August) before the Khartoum declaration was issued, it is clear that Israel did not agree with the call in the joint U.S.- Soviet resolution to return to the pre-war boundaries. Israel was not prepared to do so, not “even in exchange for a peace treaty”. It now wanted ‘secure’ boundaries. That could mean almost anything. And in the post Khartoum years the talk of prominent Israeli politicians and military men on that issue was well suited to fuel the Arabs’ worst suspicions and fears.

References to possible boundaries for Israel became more and more inflated and had by 1973, on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, apparently reached a megalomaniac crescendo. So said Abba Eban in a 1976 interview with Shlaim (belatedly published in Israel Studies 2003 Vol.8 No.1):

“The rhetoric of 1973 is almost inconceivable, with Ariel Sharon saying that we could capture everything from Tunis and Iran between Turkey and the Sudan; Dayan saying that, for the next ten years, the issue was not peace, but to draw a new map, because, in the next ten years, there would be neither peace nor war; Itzhak Rabin's statement in 1973 that Golda had better boundaries than King David and King Solomon had had … So that it is really how opinion passed from sobriety to self-confidence, and from self-confidence to fantasy, reaching a somewhat absurd level in 1973 ... ”

What is also apparent from these documents is Hussein’s almost frantic attempts to come, pre-Khartoum, to a negotiated settlement with Israel – even with the tacit understanding of Nasser (who was however not trusted by the Americans). Rusk was very happy with Hussein’s overtures and recommended them emphatically to the Israelis who reacted coolly. Their fist reaction was that there was nothing new in Hussein’s approach.

Uri Avneri has, in commenting on Israel’s reception of the Arab peace plan that has become identified with the name of Prince Abdallah (as if this broadly supported Arab proposal only came from him), delineated the various stages of the usual Israeli reaction to peace overtures: “PHASE A is designed to belittle the offer. "There is nothing new there," the Political Sources would assert. "It is offered solely for tactical purposes. It is a political gimmick". If the offer comes from an Arab: "He says it to the international community, but not to his own people". In short, "It's not serious." “

Thus the reaction to Hussein’s pre-Khartoum overtures ran to type. Moreover, the basis for any understanding was taken away with the hasty annexation (eh, ‘unification’) of East Jerusalem and Israel’s far reaching plans for settlements on the West Bank.

The first document offered here concerns Eban’s first post 19th of June conversation with the American Secretary of State, containing the Israeli cabinet’s ‘tentative conclusions ‘ as he called them, that were, by the magic of political spin, post facto transformed into an ‘offer’.

(Wherever I have left out fragments in the following documents I have inserted the usual three dots)

314. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, June 22, 1967, 0455Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Received at 3:27 a.m. Passed to the White House at 3:44 a.m. Secretary Rusk was in New York June 19-June 23 to attend the Special Session of the UN General Assembly.
...
Secretary and Ambassador Goldberg received Israeli FonMin Eban along with Rafael and Harman 7:15 p.m. June 21. Hour's conversation revolved around two main topics: (A) Situation in Near East and Israeli view re settlement and (B) present parliamentary situation in UNGA. This telegram covers topic (A)./2/
...
Eban stated Israeli inter-ministerial committee had come to some tentative conclusions which he would like to discuss with Secretary but not others.

Egypt-Israel. Israelis wanted peace treaty on basis present international frontiers. This would involve Israeli maritime passage through Straits Tiran and Suez Canal and air passage over straits. In context non-belligerency this would mean Israel would be treated like everyone else. In same context Israel envisaged demilitarization of Sinai, which was natural barrier between two countries. From Egypt, Israel wanted only security, no territory. Israelis felt Egypt might be attracted to this concept.
Important thing that there must be treaty which committed Egyptians. Israeli unwilling accept another understanding on basis of assumptions. This had been major fault of 1957 arrangements which had committed much of world but not Egypt.

Israel-Syria. Israelis would like peace treaty on the basis of the international frontiers with some understanding that Syrian hills overlooking Israeli territory would be demilitarized. Israelis would also like assurances that Syria would not use returned territory for purpose of diversion of Jordan waters away from Israel. Eban noted that Syrians unable divert these waters now because Israeli held essential territory. Eban concluded that Israel was offering both Egypt and Syria complete withdrawal to international frontiers. These terms not ungenerous.

Gaza. Eban noted that Egypt had never claimed Gaza, had not accepted responsibility for occupying it, or for the refugees. The natural thing was for Gaza to be in Israel. Israelis would make every effort on behalf of Gaza population which totaled over 350,000 people. This plus Israel's present Arab population would bring total Arabs in Israel to about 700,000. Israelis wondered whether some could not be settled elsewhere, e.g. northern part of Sinai, "Central Palestine" or West Bank of Jordan. Israelis would like to maintain status of UNRWA as source of assistance to these people.

West Bank of Jordan.

Eban said Israeli thinking "less crystalized" re West Bank. They were still working on basis two tendencies, two conceptions in GOI. One tendency assumed that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would continue and that an agreed settlement on the basis of the demarcation line should be worked out. Another idea was that there should be some kind of association between the West Bank and Israel on the basis of autonomy and economic union.

The difficulty with this latter approach, said Eban, was that it would push Hussein back across the Jordan River. Moreover, there were no international constitutional precedents for such an arrangement.

The Secretary interposed by wondering whether there were not precedents on the basis of letting the people concerned decide. Eban replied that GOI was trying to take soundings on the intelligence level. There were some "serious" Arab leaders on West Bank who felt that their relationship with East Jordan had been artificial and had provided them no security. Others had Hashemite loyalties.
...
Secretary commented that it was helpful to have these preliminary thoughts.
...
Jerusalem. Secretary hoped that Israel would be very careful with regard to Jerusalem as it involved actual or latent passions of an enormous number of people. The matter was very delicate and could be a source of strong anti-Israel feeling in the United States. Eban replied that Israel was trying to put the Christian holy places under Christian control and the Moslem holy places under Moslem control. Eban admitted that Israel had a job to do in projecting publicly its intentions regarding access to holy places.
...

To be continued

The Olive Branch and Khartoum III

329. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 27, 1967.
...
The Israelis tell us they have not yet finally made up their minds on the position they will take with regard to the West Bank generally, and Jerusalem in particular. So far, we have advised them not to take unilateral actions, nor to present the world with a fait accompli.
...
Nicholas deB Katzenbach

. 331. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 28, 1967, 1:30-3:10 p.m.
...
SUBJECT
Prospects for solution of the Middle East Crisis
PARTICIPANTS
President Johnson Secretary McNamara
King Hussein Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Mr. George Christian
Mr. McGeorge Bundy Ambassador Macomber
Foreign Minister Tuqan Ambassador Shubeilat
General Khammash
Ambassador Burns
...
The King noted that the Arabs were at a major turning point. They could opt for what amounted to a settlement with Israel, to be followed by concentration on economic development; or the Arabs could opt to make no settlement and to re-arm for another round. Hussein favored the first course.
...
338. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/
Tel Aviv, July 2, 1967, 1130Z.
...
/2/Telegram 218573 to Tel Aviv, June 29, instructed Barbour to register U.S. opposition to any unilateral action by Israel to assert de jure control over occupied territories. (Ibid.)
/3/Document 333.
/4/Telegram 3 from Tel Aviv, July 1, reported that before receiving telegrams 218573 and 219964, Barbour had discussed the subject of Jerusalem with the Israeli Minister of Justice and several other officials and had strongly deplored the "precipitate issuance unification ordinance re Jerusalem." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
...
3. However, as to Jerusalem, GOI adamant.
...
Barbour (Barbour was the American Ambassador in Israel - A.B.)

360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, July 13, 1967, 11:06 p.m.
...
6581. Please deliver at once following message from Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Eban reported at Plaza Hotel.

Dear Mr. Minister:

We have today received a most urgent and private message from King Hussein./2/ This message informs us that the King has determined that he is prepared to conclude some sort of arrangement with the Government of Israel. In the meeting in Cairo he apparently informed Nasser of the possibility that he may undertake such an action. The exact steps and the circumstances under which negotiation might be possible are yet to be determined and the timing is, of course, a matter of major importance.

/2/Telegram 4941 from Amman, July 13, reported a conversation between King Hussein and Ambassador Burns in which the King stated he was prepared to make a unilateral settlement with Israel, and that he had discussed this with Nasser, who had said he would raise no objections if Hussein raised this with the Americans. The King said he would like to know what the Israelis would be likely to do vis-à-vis Jordan if he were prepared for a settlement. He said Jordan would have to get back substantially all it lost in the war, including the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem. He also said it was essential that Jordan obtain some arms immediately. (National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

In our opinion this is a major act of courage on the part of King Hussein and offers the first important breakthrough toward peace in the current period following active hostilities. It is an opportunity in our judgment that must not be lost, offering as it does a chance to embark on a course in the Arab world which could lead to an acceptance of Israel by its neighbors and to steps which could well change the whole course of history in the Middle East.

We wish that time were available for us to consider abstractly and unrelated to immediate problems all of the issues that are involved in this offer. But we believe we have tomorrow in the vote in the United Nations on the Pakistan resolution an opportunity to pave the way for positive steps in the days ahead--an opportunity that must not be lost. With the knowledge of King Hussein's willingness to risk a very great deal, certainly including his own security, it is imperative, we think, that your government take a step in connection with the consideration of the future of Jerusalem that would be in harmony with the courage shown by the King and which will facilitate negotiations in the days ahead of us. We urge that you attempt to make the broadest kind of gesture possible with respect to the future of Jerusalem. We urge especially that you make a generous offer with respect to the future of Jerusalem that would in effect explicitly interpret as interim the administrative arrangements recently placed in effect with respect to that city. We would also hope that your country could offer more explicitly to enter into international arrangements for a city which would assure that all religions and all faiths have access to the holy places. The offer might include a willingness to discuss with Jordan directly or otherwise the future of the old city based on the concept of universality, possibly pointing to Jordan as the spokesman for the Arab world in view of its location in relation both to Israel and to Jerusalem itself.

Let me add that as you know our own position on Jerusalem has for some years supported its international character, a position to which we still adhere.

The matter is urgent. The events of tomorrow in the General Assembly may have an important bearing on the greatest opportunity we have yet seen to achieve what you and your country have wanted and have suffered through two wars to achieve. I urge your most careful and urgent consideration of this matter. The more moderate and generous the position of Israel tomorrow, the greater the chance that there can be a good result from Hussein's new readiness.

For Tel Aviv:
To save time and emphasize importance we attached to this message Ambassador should deliver it at once to highest available official with urgent informal suggestion it go at once to Eskhol if Eban has not yet had time to report it.

Rusk

The Olive Branch and Khartoum IV

Hussein’s overtures apparently received no publicity in Israel. In a dispatch dating from December 1967 one of the most respected Israeli journalists, Amos Elon, wrote: “As far as such things can be ascertained … no political feelers were put out by the Jordanians, except on one occasion through an unidentified third party; judging from what Prime Minister Eshkol later told an interviewer about this feeler it did not appear to have been serious.” Thus was Avneri’s script followed to the letter.

Further with the archival pieces.

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/
...
Tel Aviv, July 14, 1967, 2135Z.
167. State 6581./2/
...
2. Eshkol welcomed overture from Hussein. However, he professed inability to understand our apparent surprise at Hussein's step. Recalling various recent statements by King which he interpreted to effect King would attempt achieve Arab summit and failing that would feel free to proceed on his own, Prime Minister said move should not have been unexpected. What disturbed Eshkol was tenor of Secretary's message that Israel should respond with concessions on Jerusalem and specifically indicate a willingness to regard renunciation of city under Israeli control as subject modification. He averred most positively that he had stretched his cabinet like a rubber band on a number of problems which had been considered in last few weeks but that rubber band would break immediately if he authorized Eban to make any statements that measures to reunify city only "interim" and subject further debate. As to GA debate and resolution on Jerusalem he urged that we not support resolution calling for retrogression. His argument was that such U.S. support would be disservice to Hussein who would then be expected to achieve more in negotiation than any Israeli Government could ultimately give.
...
Barbour

367. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 15, 1967, 11 a.m.-12:03 p.m.
...
SUBJECT

Near East Settlement

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel
Ambassador Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Emanuel Shimoni, Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister
The Secretary and Under Secretary
M--Mr. Rostow
NEA--Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary
...
The Secretary said that the Palestinian solution would seem to involve a second-class status for the Arabs and could lead to Palestinian demands to become the 14th Arab state.
...
The Secretary saw real trouble ahead on Jerusalem. There are strong feelings in many places on this issue. The USG had never agreed with either the Israeli or Jordanian positions on Jerusalem, and there had been sharp, adverse reaction to recent Israeli steps in Jerusalem. The question of Jerusalem must be kept open for further discussion and negotiations. The U.S. sought solid international arrangements, and this would not be satisfied by scattered rights over a few holy places.
...
WR

370. Memorandum of Meeting/1/

Washington, July 16, 1967, noon.

. The meeting is also recorded in a July 16 memorandum from Wriggins to Walt Rostow and Bundy, which describes it as a meeting of the "inner circle of the Control Group"--Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, Battle, Kohler, and Wriggins, plus Walsh and Burns. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII)
...
1. Hussein has informed us of his desire to reach a settlement with Israel. He has staked out a negotiating position of a return to the political lines of June 4, including Jordanian control of the Old City of Jerusalem. He is prepared to accept some border rectification, accompanied by over-flight rights and port facilities in Israel. He wishes us to determine whether this would be in the Israeli ball park. The Israelis, in turn, have informed us that they are ready to talk to the Jordanians although they are uncertain about the seriousness of Hussein.
2. The key to a negotiated settlement is Jerusalem. We need a better assessment of Israel's flexibility on this subject before giving a definitive reply to Hussein.

385. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 21, 1967.

SUBJECT

The Middle East as we Approach the Weekend
...
The Israelis are now telling us that they are not ready for serious talks (though they can handle opening feelers), and it looks as if it would take a little time to get this thing going in any event.
2. Arthur Goldberg tells me that the most recent effort to get an agreed resolution on substance has run up against an Arab stone wall. It was a good game to play out, and I think he handled it extremely well in the face of Israeli worries which were both foolish and foolishly expressed.
...
Finally, I should report that there are a number of other signs of hardening Israeli positions up and down the line. Their intemperate reaction to Goldberg's skillful round with Gromyko, their edginess about the Jordanian negotiations, their increasing interest in solutions that would not return the West Bank to Jordan, and the evidence of political jockeying among their leaders (each tougher than the other) make me think that the time is coming for American words and actions which will have at least a constructive effect in knocking you off the top of the Israeli polls. The trick will be to achieve that result without any parallel impact at home.

To be continued

The Olive Branch and Khartoum V

At the editor’s request I am adding some elucidatory notes to the following archivalia. ed Hamish: thanks.

The following number, 398, was archived to put on record a conversation between Walter Rostow, then Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (a post now called National Security Adviser) to President Johnson, and Evron, then the Israeli Ambassador to the USA. However, I have only included an editorial note (in the original printed in blue) going with that memo about a conversation between Lucius Battle, then US Asst. Secretary of State for Near East and South East Asian Affairs and Evron since that has to do with our topic. The actual conversation between Rostow and Evron had mainly to do with technical matters (armament I seem to remember).

398. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 30, 1967.
...
Mr. Ephraim Evron, Minister, Embassy of Israel, called me yesterday [July 30] and asked if he could drop by at my home on his way back from the airport where he was leaving his wife at 10:00 p.m. I agreed.
...
/3/Evron told Battle in a luncheon conversation on July 31 that the Israelis were convinced that "time is on their side and that the longer the Suez Canal is closed and the greater the economic problem in the UAR, the better chance that Nasser will be the first Arab country to come to peace terms with them." (Memorandum of conversation, July 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
...
Walt

Next item is self-elucidatory.

399. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 31, 1967.
...
/SUBJECT
The Middle East at the End of July
The Israeli position appears to be hardening as the Arabs still resist all direct negotiations. The Israelis have great confidence in their short-run political and military superiority. I think the evidence grows that they plan to keep not only all of Jerusalem but the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, too.
...

The following telegram is from the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to Barbour, the US Ambassador to Israel, and refers to a report Rusk had received from Rostow (see above) concerning a conversation between Burns, US Ambassador to Jordan, and the Jordanian King, Hussein.

405. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
Washington, August 4, 1967, 0001Z.
...
15897. 1. During Evron call August 2, Under Secretary Rostow reported that Ambassador Burns, on basis his recent talks with King Hussein, thought Hussein still wanted settlement and was attempting strengthen his position as preparatory step.
Rostow said our own soundings indicated there was strong feeling about Jerusalem in Moslem world. If formula on Jerusalem could be found which would permit Jordanian-Israeli deal, this could be of crucial importance. It should not be beyond the wit of man to find such formula. Rostow recalled Eban's statement to Secretary that Israeli stand on Jerusalem represented "negotiating position" and that key consideration for Israel was preservation "unified administration." This was not excluded by Hussein./2/ (Evron interjected to say "you mean unified Israeli administration.") Rostow said we would continue to explore Jerusalem question and Israel must not exclude consideration of alternative arrangements.
...
Rusk

The following memorandum refers to a conversation between H.H.Saunders, an Asst.Secretary at the State Dept., and Evron, the Israeli Ambassador to the USA.

418. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 15, 1967.
...
SUBJECT
Discussion with Israeli Minister
...
I expressed concern that Israel seemed to be digging into its present position more solidly every day. Each new headline painted a darker image. Without even arguing the merits of letting the dust settle, I saw a problem for both of us in the rapidly sharpening image of Israel as the intransigent victor holding onto its spoils. Evron said it was inevitable that Israel (and we) would have a hard time in the coming UNGA. I suggested that there are two ways of dealing with the inevitable. One is to sit on your hands and accept all its consequences; the other is to see whether you can't do something to face it with some dignity instead of just sticking your head in the sand and letting the brickbats fly.
...
H.H.S.

The next item is a telegram from the US Ambassador in Israel, Barbour, to the Department of State. The first paragraph is an added editorial note.

425. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/
Tel Aviv, August 21, 1967, 0900Z.
...
524. Ref: State 23385./2/
/2/Telegram 23385 to Tel Aviv, August 18, states that the Department had noted with increasing concern recent statements by Israeli public figures about long-term Israeli policy on the West Bank and other occupied areas and was concerned that they might indicate increasing Israeli determination to occupy permanently the territories currently under military occupation. (Ibid.)
1. We share Dept's concern at recent spate statements by Israeli political leaders indicating hardening of positions in [garble] permanently expanded Israel. (See also our A-109 and A-113.)/3/ If Arabs continue unready to talk peace and Israeli political scene continues as hotly competitive as it has been--at this juncture both contingencies seem likely--then Israeli opinion, stimulated by politicians staking out ever more advanced frontiers in the occupied territories, must perforce be increasingly conditioned to accept [as] permanent many aspects of the present territorial situation.
...
Barbour

The last item concerns a conversation between Walter Rostow (see above) and the Israeli Ambassador.

431. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 29, 1967.
...
Minister Evron came in, at his request, to make two points on direct instruction from Foreign Minister Eban.
...
2. The UN Resolution
The heart of the Israeli objection to the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution is its implication that Israel must return to the territories occupied on June 4. Even in exchange for a peace treaty Israel is not prepared for a simple return to the June 4 boundaries. What Israel will seek by agreement with the Arabs are "secure" boundaries, in addition to maintaining the unity of the city of Jerusalem. When I noted that we had not accepted the June 4 date in the UN resolution, Evron said the resolution still contained the language: "withdrawal from all occupied territories." He said that the Israeli Government was quite content with the carefully designed language used by the President with respect to boundaries, most recently in his communication with Tito; but it was essential that the U.S. position in the UN not clash with the President's formula of "secure and agreed borders."
...
WR

The Olive Branch and Khartoum VI – Postscript

The notion that Israel held on to a land-for-peace formula until 'the three noes of Khartoum', with its implied suggestion that in return for peace agreements it was willing to return to the pre 4th of June borders - that, at any case, already gave Israel 26% more of the 1947 territory than it had been allocated by the UN - is a myth. It is one of the many myths about this conflict that have been built up over the years and that are hard to dislodge because of the pervasiveness of pro-Israel apologetics.

If on the 19th of June 1967 the Israeli cabinet showed willingness to return to the pre-war borders, at any case as far as Egypt and Syria were concerned, it is clear that by the end of August and BEFORE KHARTOUM this willingness had disappeared. The talk was then of ‘secure borders’ not the ‘international boundaries’.

It is also clear that the Israeli cabinet reacted negatively to the overtures of Hussein that were received on the basis of the strategy sketched by Avneri viz ‘there is nothing new here’ and ‘this is not serious’. But what really blocked those attempts at peace was Israeli unwillingness to make the annexation of East Jerusalem undone and to give up settlement plans for the West Bank. It was Israel that was not serious about peace with Hussein.

And in the Israeli cabinet even the doves grew gradually more hawkish.

Elon mentions in his dispatch of December 1967 I have referred to earlier (it is included in his book “‘A Blood-Dimmed Tide”) that “even as moderate a man as Foreign Minister Abba Eban said that any peace conference would serve first to negotiate a ‘new map’ of the area. Israel must not withdraw to what he called its former ‘Auschwitz borders’ “ (whatever that may mean).

The intellectual elite, that usually sees critique of the powers that be as one of its main tasks, now shared this hawkish mood, even to the extent that professional hawks became worried. Elon refers to a statement by one senior army officer who said; “They frighten me, these intellectuals and poets …It is strange: if I were intoxicated with victory, that would be bad but natural. But they…?”

Voices of moderation were few and far between but they were there. Elon quotes Professor JL Talmon of the Hebrew University who wrote “The example of other nations fills me with the fear of lurking dangers to the moral texture, mental balance and spiritual values of a master race.” The statement is a bit obscure ('and spiritual values' should presumably be 'from the spiritual values') but nevertheless prophetic...

And what about Khartoum? Was it really a manifestation of complete Arab obstinacy and determination to see Israel wiped off the map? To take one’s cue here from the public broadcasts of the time is to confuse demagogics with diplomacy.

The two Israeli historians who have dealt in the greatest detail with this period, Avi Shlaim and Michael Oren, are too professional to fall into this trap. Michael Oren wrote:

“Western observers would later debate whether Khartoum was a victory for Arab moderation or radicalism. True, it vetoed any interaction with Israel, but it appeared to open doors to third party arbitration and the demilitarization of the occupied territories.”

Oren also said: “For the Israeli’s the ‘three no’s’ of Khartoum effectively closed the door on the June 19 resolution”. A shade of the old myth here. Perhaps there is for Oren a difference between merely closing a door and ‘effectively’ closing it.

Shlaim, who is generally more critical of Israel than Oren, wrote about Khartoum:

“The conference ended with the adoption of the famous three noes of Khartoum: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel. On the face of it these declarations showed no sign of readiness for compromise, and this is how Israel interpreted them. In fact, the conference was a victory for the Arab moderates who argued for trying to obtain the withdrawal of Israel’s forces by political rather than military means. Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of a state of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties, and no de jure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state.

"President Nasser and King Hussein set the tone at the summit and made it clear subsequently that they were prepared to go much further than ever before toward settlement with Israel.”

This is borne out by Elon who wrote five years ago:

“Peace, at least with Egypt and Jordan, we now know, was a practical possibility from as early as 1970-71 ... In 1971, UN mediator Gunnar Jarring addressed partly identical notes to the governments of Israel and Egypt. He asked Egypt whether it was ready to conclude a peace treaty if Israel withdrew from occupied Egyptian territory. And he asked Israel whether it was ready to withdraw if Egypt made peace with it. Egypt’s answer was yes. Israel’s answer was no.”